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Office Memorandum

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
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TO : U/SA Files

FROM : J. B. Koopfli *guc*

SUBJECT: Meeting in regard to Operation

XDS or XDS EXT DATE: August 22, 1951
 TS AUTH. REASON(S)
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 DECLASSIFIED ~~UNRELEASABLE~~
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Those attending: Mr. W. Park Armstrong, Jr. - R
Mr. Theodore M. Nordbeck - IAD
Dr. Chatwell - CIA
Mr. Alexander - CIA
J. B. Kocouli

Dr. Chadwell gave us some reactions which he had obtained from the British which indicated that contact people for Operation 63 had gone to people in the British Zone, which presents a problem. There was general agreement that the whole thing had been conducted in a very unfortunate manner, even granting that the objectives were desirable. Since the operation involves denial to the Russians together with the acquisition of top technical ability in this country, it was pointed out that the intelligence interest was peripheral only. Mr. Armstrong proposed and it was agreed that GER was the most interested area in the Department, that they should prepare a working paper in consultation with this office and the R area, that this paper should state the objectives to be gained by Operation 63 and then set forth the over-all scientific policy aim in Western Germany and then set forth the undesirable aspects of 63 as it is now conducted, followed by a proposal as to how it could be conducted and still be in harmony with over-all policy. Mr. Armstrong then proposed that Mr. Bohlen, the Department's senior representative on NSC, should introduce the paper, and it is then expected that the NSC will appoint a sub-committee, ad hoc or otherwise, to go into the whole matter. It was agreed that it was only at this level that anything constructive could be accomplished, in view of the various interests involved. In the meantime Mr. B. R. Shute, Director of the Office of Intelligence, HICOG, in a letter dated August 3 to Mr. Armstrong indicated that they felt that for the moment no further operations would be carried out in Germany until a policy determination was made here. Everyone was doubtful, however, as to how long this could be maintained.

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